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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
I. CHILD SUPPORT
A. The Age of Emancipation
A well-settled axiom of South Carolina law is that a court
order for child support remains subject to review and modifica-
tion by the court upon a showing of changed conditions.' Cason
v. Cason2 recognized that the constitutional amendment lowering
the age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen3 was a "changed
condition" warranting modification of child support orders.
Relying upon a North Carolina case, Shoaf v. Shoaf,4 the
South Carolina Supreme Court held, inter alia,5 that the General
Assembly has the power to determine the age of majority and that
reducing the age of majority to eighteen years effectively emanci-
pates minor children at that age and terminates the duty of sup-
port.' The court concluded: "[t]hat the age of majority was
twenty-one (21) at the time of the decree . . . does not create a
vested right to have support continued to age 21 regardless of any
1. Cason v. Cason, 271 S.C. 393, 398, 247 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1978).
2. 271 S.C. 393, 247 S.E.2d 673 (1978).
3. S.C. CONST. art. 17, § 14. The amendment states:
Every citizen who is eighteen years of age or older, not laboring under disabili-
ties prescribed in this Constitution or otherwise established by law, shall be
deemed sui juris and endowed with full legal rights and responsibilities, pro-
vided, that the General Assembly may restrict the sale of alcoholic beverages
to persons until age twenty-one.
Id.
4. 282 N.C. 287, 192 S.E.2d 299 (1972). See Blackard v. Blackard, 426 S.W.2d 471
(Ky. 1968); Young v. Young, 413 S.W.2d 887 (Ky. 1967); Mason v. Mason, 84 N.M. 720,
507 P.2d 781 (1973); Istnick v. Istnick, 37 Ohio Misc. 91, 307 N.E.2d 922 (1973).
5. Appellant and respondent were divorced in 1969. Appellant wife was granted cus-
tody of the four minor children and awarded $250 monthly as child support. Respondent
husband's subsequent petition for a reduction in his child support payments due to the
emancipation by marriage of one of the children was denied, thereby increasing the re-
maining three children's proportionate amounts.
The present petition by respondent requested termination of his obligation to con-
tinue support payments for two sons, one who was killed in an automobile accident and
another who had attained 18 years of age. Appellant counterclaimed for an increase in
alimony and child support and an award of attorney's fees. The family court judge termi-
nated support for the sons, increased the support payments for the remaining minor child,
denied the request for an increase in alimony, and denied the request for attorney's fees.
On appeal, the supreme court held that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying
attorney's fees and remanded the issue. The remainder of the lower court's order, however,
was affirmed. 271 S.C. at 394, 247 S.E.2d at 673.
6. Id. at 399, 247 S.E.2d at 676.
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change in the law."7
In Cason appellant ex-wife argued that the provisions of
South Carolina Code section 15-1-320 were determinative in in-
terpreting the term "minors" in divorce decrees. Appellant
argued that the statute's language required that divorce decrees
be construed under the law in existence at the time the decree was
issued. The pertinent portion of the statute provides "that any
person performing any act or receiving any property, rights or
responsibilities pursuant to an instrument executed prior to Feb-
ruary 6, 1975, shall have his majority or minority determined by
the law relating to majority or minority in existence at the time
of the execution of such instrument."9
The court disagreed with appellant and found nothing in the
statute's language to warrant the conclusion that a court decree
or order was an "instrument" within the ambit of the statute.'"
The court reasoned that the legislature could easily have included
child support orders, if desired, in the statute. Because the legis-
lature failed to refer specifically to existing court-ordered child
support obligations, the supreme court refused to recognize a leg-
islative intent to include these obligations in the statute." The
court interpreted the statutory term "instrument" as referring
only to private written agreements 2 and held that "[t]he consti-
tutional and statutory provisions in question clearly changed the
conditions affecting the obligation for support under the decree
7. Id., 247 S.E.2d at 675.
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-1-320(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978). Section 15-1-320(a) provides:
All references to minors in the law of this State shall after February 6, 1975, be
deemed to mean persons under the age of eighteen years except in laws relating
to the sale of alcoholic beverages; provided, however, that any person perform-
ing any act or receiving any property, rights or responsibilities pursuant to an
instrument executed prior to February 6, 1975, shall have his majority or minor-
ity determined by the law relating to majority or minority in existence at the
time of the execution of such instrument.
Id.
9. Id.
10. 271 S.C. at 400, 247 S.E.2d at 676.
11. Id.
12. Id. The court stated that:
The use of the term "instrument" in the statute was intended to refer to
private written agreements and to assure that any person under twenty-one, who
was performing any act or receiving any property rights or responsibilities pur-
suant to such a private written agreement, executed prior to February 6, 1975,
would have his majority or minority determined by the law in existence at the
time of the execution of such written instrument.
[Vol. 31
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by fixing a different date upon which liability to support a child
terminated." 3
The court in Cason noted an explicit exception to the termi-
nation of the duty to support at age eighteen when the right to
support arises from contract.'4 Demonstrative of this exception
was the 1977 case of Schadel v. SchadeI15 in which the parties
executed a property and support agreement that was incorpo-
rated into the court's divorce order. The agreement specifically
provided for support until the child attained age twenty-one.'"
The supreme court held ,that the father's obligation should
"continue as specified in the agreement and the divorce decree
into which the agreement was incorporated."'' 7
The provisions of South Carolina Code section 15-1-320 8
standing alone support the Schadel exception. The instrument
(private support and property agreement) was executed prior to
February 6, 1975, and provided for a minor to receive "property,
rights or responsibilities." Hence, the age of majority would be
determined under the law existing at the time of the execution
of the instrument.
The possible existence of another exception to the sweeping
termination of the duty to support at age eighteen may result
from the wording of the divorce decree in Cason. The original
decree required the respondent to make child support payments
monthly, but established no period of duration for payment;"
thus, "[t]he decree could require respondent to support his child
only until he reached majority or was otherwise emancipated."'"
Similarly, the decree in Shoaf contained the proviso "that said
payments for child support shall continue uhtil such time as said
minor child reaches his majority or is otherwise emancipated."'2
13. Id. at 398-99, 247 S.E.2d at 675.
14. Id. at 398, 247 S.E.2d at 675.
15. 268 S.C. 50, 232 S.E.2d 17 (1977).
16. Id. at 56, 232 S.E.2d at 19. The agreement, executed in March 1973, stated that
child support shall continue up until the age of twenty-one so long as the child is not
emancipated and is "enrolled in a fulitime course of higher education, this meaning a
college, technical school, trade school, or other accredited school. . . ." Id. But see Whitt
v. Whitt, 490 S.W.2d 159 (Tenn. 1973) (reduction in age of majority applied to a support
agreement).
17. 268 S.C. at 57, 232 S.E.2d at 20.
18. S.C. COD ANN. § 15-1-320(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978). See note 8 supra for the text
of § 15-1-320(a).
19. 271 S.C. at 398, 247 S.E.2d at 675.
20. Id. at 399, 247 S.E.2d at 675.
21. 282 N.C. at 288, 192 S.E.2d at 301.
1979]
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The principle emerging from these cases is that a court order
either silent on the termination date for child support or using the
term "majority," will be construed judicially to refer to the age
of majority fixed by statute or common law. Because the age of
majority is a status that is within the power of the General As-
sembly to set, a modification reducing the age subsequent to a
judicial decree effectively modifies that decree and emancipates
the child at the lower age.22
B. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act2
(URESA), which was drafted and approved by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1950, is pres-
ently in force in some form in every American jurisdiction. 2 The
South Carolina General Assembly adopted URESA in 1954 and
amended it in 1968 and 1972.25
URESA provides a uniform method of enforcing the duties
of support when the obligor and the obligee are located in differ-
ent states. The obligee, or the state furnishing support to an
obligee, files a verified complaint in a court of the initiating state.
This complaint is transmitted to the state that has jurisdiction
over the obligor. The responding state dockets the action and
proceeds against the obligor. The responding state transmits its
resulting order of support to the court of the initiating state and
may also receive and transmit to the initiating state payments
made by the obligor.
2
1
Hoover v. Hoover,27 the first South Carolina case to interpret
URESA, ostensibly evidences that the enforcement procedure "is
not limited to only those cases where the father has left the com-
mon domicile, but applies equally where the wife has taken the
children from the state of common domicile. '28 The prime issue
decided by the court in Hoover, however, was "whether the lower
22. 271 S.C. at 398-99, 247 S.E.2d at 676. Accord, 282 N.C. at 292, 192 S.E.2d at 302-
03.
23. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-110 to -470 (1976).
24. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMESTc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 206 (1968).
25. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-110 to -470 (1976).
26. Id.
27. 271 S.C. 177, 246 S.E.2d 179 (1978).
28. Brief of Appellant at 5. See generally Edwards v. Edwards, 146 A.2d 774 (D.C.
1958); Byrne v. Byrne, 212 Pa. Super. Ct. 566, 243 A.2d 196 (1968). Commonwealth v.
Mexal, 201 Pa. Super. Ct. 457, 193 A.2d 680 (1963).
[Vol. 31
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court had jurisdiction under URESA to impose the visitation
condition on Mr. Hoover's duty of support.
'29
The facts of Hoover are rather interesting. After Mrs. Hoover
left her husband a second time, she initiated a URESA action in
Michigan for the support of herself and her two minor children,
one of whom was born subsequent to Mrs. Hoover's departure
from South Carolina." Pursuant to the support proceeding in
Michigan, the responding state, South Carolina, brought an ac-
tion to determine the husband's liability for support. The South
Carolina circuit court" did not require the husband to support his
wife, but ordered him to support his two minor children, subject
to the condition that he be allowed visitation privileges.2 Neither
party appealed the order. Subsequently, the husband was held in
contempt for failure to pay support from March 1977 through
June 1977. The court found, however, that the wife's refusal to
allow visitation excused the husband's failure to make his pay-
ments after June 1977. 3
On appeal by the wife the supreme court held that the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of the original support proceedings in
South Carolina did not include jurisdiction "to adjudicate mat-
ters of visitation."34 The court further noted that objection to a
court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any
time; and that a court's action in matters over which it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction is void.35 Since the trial court had
29. 271 S.C. at 178, 246 S.E.2d at 179.
30. Id. at 179, 246 S.E.2d at 179-80.
31. At the time of the proceedings the circuit courts and the family courts exercised
concurrent jurisdiction. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-415 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
32. Pertinent provisions of the order are as follows:
It is further ORDERED that the petitioner, Merliee Dawn Hoover, is to
allow the respondent to have custody of said children three weeks during the
summer for a period between June 15 and July 31 each year, upon written
request to her stating the time of the visitation...
It is further ORDERED that the said Herbert Lynwood Hoover, Jr., respon-
dent, shall have the right to have the children visit one week before or after
Christmas of each year ...
It is further ORDERED that in the event the petitioner refuses to allow said
children to visit the respondent, as above stated, that the respondent shall be
immediately relieved of all obligation to make further child support payments
until said visitation rights are allowed.
271 S.C. at 179, 946 S.E.2d at 180.
33. Id. at 180, 246 S.E.2d at 180.
34. Id. at 182, 246 S.E.2d at 181.
35. Id. at 180, 246 S.E.2d at 180 (citing State v. Funderburk, 259 S.C. 256, 191 S.E.2d
520 (1972)). The original order with its visitation conditions was declared res judicata
1979]
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jurisdiction over the subject matter of support, the portions of its
order requiring the husband to pay $100 support per month per
child were upheldA
The supreme court stated that "[t]he purpose of URESA is
'to improve and extend by reciprocal legislation the enforcement
of duties of support and to make uniform the law with respect
thereto."" Moreover, "[t]he only subject covered by URESA is
the duty of support, and section 20-7-160 expressly provides that
participation in a URESA proceeding 'shall not confer upon any
court jurisdiction of any of the parties thereto in any other pro-
ceeding.' "31 The supreme court relied on cases from North Caro-
lina, Georgia, and Florida to place a narrow construction on the
statute's jurisdictional reach and to exclude matters of visita-
tion."
In analyzing the decision, practitioners should avoid reading
the opinion too broadly. The holding is not that URESA subject
matter jurisdiction is limited to duties of support, but rather that
visitation rights are not part of the subject matter jurisdiction.4 0
Furthermore, Chief Justice Lewis' separate concurring opinion
suggests that the holding be limited to child support and not to
alimony.' It will be difficult, however, to reconcile conferring
subject matter jurisdiction on matters other than support pro-
ceedings in an alimony support case while denying such jurisdic-
tion in a child support case because the duties of support quoted
during the contempt proceeding. Record at 17.
36. 271 S.C. at 182, 246 S.E.2d at 181.
37. Id. at 181, 246 S.E.2d at 180 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-120 (1976)).
38. 271 S.C. at 181, 246 S.E.2d at 181. See generally Grosse v. Grosse, 347 So. 2d 1099
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Register v. Kandlbinder, 134 Ga. App. 754, 216 S.E.2d 647
(1975).
39. 271 S.C. at 181-82, 246 S.E.2d at 181. See generally Grosse v. Grosse, 347 So. 2d
1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977);Vecellio v. Vecellio, 313 So. 2d 61 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975); Register v. Kandlbinder, 134 Ga. App. 754, 216 S.E.2d 647 (1975); Thibadeau v.
Thibadeau, 133 Ga. App. 154, 210 S.E.2d 340 (1974); Pifer v. Pifer, 31 N.C. App. 486, 229
S.E.2d 700 (1976); Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 768 (1955); see also Blois v. Blois, 138 So. 2d 373
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Commonwealth v. Balph, 210 Pa. Super. Ct. 244, 232 A.2d 76
(1967); Yeter v. Cornneau, 84 Wash. 2d 155, 524 P.2d 901 (1974). The following cases can
be distinguished as either failing to focus on the entire purpose of URESA or failing to
notice the limitations of its interstate character: Chandler v. Chandler, 109 N.H. 477, 256
A.2d 157 (1968); Daly v. Daly, 39 N.J. Super. 117, 120 A.2d 510 (1956); New Jersey v.
Morales, 35 Ohio App. 2d 56, 299 N.E.2d 920 (1973); Porter v. Porter, 25 Ohio St. 2d 123,
267 N.E.2d 298 (1971).
40. 271 S.C. at 182, 246 S.E.2d at 181.
41. Id. at 183, 246 S.E.2d at 182 (Lewis, C.J., concurring).
[Vol. 31
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in Hoover are defined by section 20-7-130(6)4z to include "any
duty of support imposed or imposable by law, or by any court
order, decree or judgment, whether interlocutory or final, whether
incidental to a proceeding for divorce, judicial separation, sepa-
rate maintenance or otherwise."4
The Chief Justice may have been referring to alimony pay-
ments and visitation rights determined either by agreement be-
tween the parties or by court decree pursuant to a divorce or
separation proceeding. A refusal to permit visitation under those
circumstances would probably fall under the provisions of section
20-7-450: "[t]he obligor may assert any defense available to a
defendant in an action on a foreign judgment.""
After Hoover, URESA could be interpreted as conferring
subject matter jurisdiction only to adjudicate duties of support
in a proceeding prior to a written agreement between the parties
or prior to a court order pursuant to a divorce or a separation
proceeding. URESA proceedings subsequent to such an agree-
ment or court order could be interpreted to permit an obligor to
assert defenses pursuant to section 20-7-450.1
I1. ALIMONY-PROHIBITION ON AWARDING SPECIFIC PROPERTY IN
LIEu OF ALIMONY
The 1975 decision in Smith v. Smith" was the first case to
construe the South Carolina Code provision authorizing alimony
payments.4 7 The supreme court held that the South Carolina ali-
mony statute contemplates payment of alimony in money; fur-
thermore, a court has no power to award specific property of the
husband as alimony." A series of 1978 decisions has reaffirmed
Smith and provided additional guidance regarding the disposi-
tion of property pursuant to divorce a vinculo matrimonii and
separation proceedings.
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-130(6) (1976).
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id. § 20-7-450 (1976).
45. Id.
46. 264 S.C. 624, 216 S.E.2d 541 (1975). For a discussion of Smith, see Domestic
Relations, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 28 S.C.L. REv. 308 (1976). The original
appearance of these two parties before the supreme court was in Smith v. Smith, 262 S.C.
291, 204 S.E.2d 53 (1974). For discussion of the earlier decision, see Domestic Relations,
Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 27 S.C.L. REV. 439 (1975).
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (1976).
48. 264 S.C. at 630, 216 S.E.2d at 544.
1979]
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In Jones v. Jones"9 the husband was ordered to pay a lump
sum of $36,000 in alimony; alternatively, he could pay $150 a
month from January 1977 through October 1977, and then convey
forty acres of cleared land to the wife for a term of twelve years.
The wife then could rent the land for tobacco growing and support
herself with the income. 0 The supreme court held that "[w]hile
the lower court lacked jurisdiction, absent consent, to order Mr.
Jones to convey his real property to Mrs. Jones, it may give Mr.
Jones the option of making such a transfer. ' '51 In addition to
allowing a specific property transfer as an alternative to alimony
payments, the supreme court recognized the propriety of award-
ing the wife the use of the family residence. It remanded this
award, however, because the trial judge failed to set forth the
salient facts and conclusions of law upon which the award was
based,5" as required by Family Court Rule 27(c). 3
A similar issue regarding occupation of the marital home by
the wife and minor children was addressed in Taylor v. Taylor.5"
In Taylor the wife appealed a portion of the lower court's order
that she contended could be interpreted as allowing the wife the
use of the marital home only so long as the children resided with
her. The supreme court found no such provision, but ruled that
the wife obtained no vested right to remain in the marital home
for the balance of her life and that changed circumstances of the
parties may necessitate future modification of support provisions
of the order."
Wilson v. Wilson56 suggests two solutions to the problems
created by prohibiting transfers of specific property as alimony:
the special equitable contribution theory and the resulting trust
theory.57 In Wilson the supreme court held that the lower court's
49. 270 S.C. 280, 241 S.E.2d 904 (1978).
50. Id. at 282, 241 S.E.2d at 905.
51. Id. at 284, 241 S.E.2d at 905.
52. Id., 241 S.E.2d at 906.
53. S.C. FAM. CT. R. 27(c). Rule 27(c) provides that:
The Order pursuant to the adjudication shall be reduced to writing as soon after
the hearing as possible, but no later than 30 days, and shall set forth the salient
facts upon which the order is granted, the conclusions of law, and such other
data relating to the decision as the court may deem desirable. Such order and
opinion, if any, may be mailed to the parties or their attorneys by ordinary mail.
Id.
54. 271 S.C. 488, 248 S.E.2d 315 (1978).
55. Id. at 491, 248 S.E.2d at 317.
56. 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 566 (1978).
57. Id. at 218, 241 S.E.2d at 567.
[Vol. 31
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss1/7
1979] DOMESTIC RELATIONS
order that the husband convey his one-half interest in the family
residence as an equitable division of property in lieu of alimony
was prohibited by Smith and remanded the case for determina-
tion of alimony." Though it disallowed the equitable division of
property in lieu of alimony, the supreme court found that because
the wife had contributed materially to the financial success of her
family and the acquisition of property by her husband, she was
entitled to the equitable ownership of a portion of the properties
held by the husband.59
The wife's argument for a resulting trust in the family resi-
dence failed because she did not show that either her funds or
joint funds were used to purchase the land upon which the second
family residence was built. 0 The former residence had been fi-
nanced from joint funds and combined wages. The land for the
second residence was purchased by Mr. Wilson and subsequently
the proceeds from the sale of the former residence were used to
construct the second home. 1 Under settled case law Mrs. Wil-
58. Id. at 222, 241 S.E.2d at 569.
59. Id.
Mrs. Wilson has been employed since the time of the marriage in 1951. At one
time she worked in a business owned by her husband and his brother-in-law and
was paid a weekly salary of only $25.00. These efforts on her part plus the
expenditure of her income for household expenses not only contributed to the
material success of the family but also freed her husband's earnings for invest-
ment.
Id. While the supreme court recognized these efforts as a material contribution, the para-
meters of what constitutes such a contribution by the wife was not resolved. The court
cited without discussion, McKenzie v. McKenzie, 254 S.C. 372, 175 S.E.2d 628 (1970), as
support for the material contribution theory. See 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 293 (1959) for the
rationale for conferring a special equity on a wife who has made such contribution to the
accumulation of property by the husband during coverture.
60. 270 S.C. at 221, 241 S.E.2d at 568.
61. Id. at 219, 241 S.E.2d at 567.
62. The court cited and quoted the following:
Moore v. McKelvey, 266 S.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 780 (1976), [held]:
It is well settled that the evidence to establish a resulting trust must
be definite, clear, unequivocal and convincing. Green v. Green, 237 S.C.
424, 117 S.E.2d 583; Hodges v. Hodges, supra, 243 S.C. 299, 133 S.E.2d
816.
In Hodges the principles were stated that "in order for a resulting
trust to arise, such must arise, if at all, at the time the purchase is made.
The funds must then, or prior thereto, be advanced and invested. A trust
will not result from funds subsequently furnished." 221 S.E.2d at 781.
In Green v. Green, supra, [the court] held that a resulting trust could be
established by tracing the proceeds from the sale of one house into the purchase
of a second house. In Green the lot on which the second house was built was
purchased with joint funds, and when the first house was sold the proceeds from
9
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son's share of the proceeds from the sale of the first home that
were used to construct the second home was not sufficient to
establish a resulting trust, because she could not trace her funds
or joint funds to the purchase of the unimproved real estate.63
The theories of special equitable ownership and resulting
trust, however, were of no avail in McCullough v. McCullough,"4
because Mrs. McCullough failed to plead for disposition of the
property. 5 In a footnote the supreme court pointed out that prior
to July 1, 1977, the authority for a property division by the court
was recognized through voluntary litigation" or by stipulation.67
Effective July 1, 1977, disposition of property between the parties
during a divorce is authorized only if prayed for in the pleadings. 8
The alimony awarded in McCullough consisted of a one-third
interest in a savings account and various shares of stock owned
by the husband.' Citing the controlling principles of Wilson and
Smith, the supreme court once again stated that "while the lower
court was at liberty to specify a property transfer as an alterna-
tive method of satisfying an alimony award, it could not uncondi-
tionally order the property transfer as alimony."70 The husband
was not given an option to remit a sum of money and the absence
of such an option bound the supreme court, through Smith, to
restrict alimony to payments in money.
7'
An intriguing question remains after these cases: what con-
stitutes property? In McCullough the alimony awarded consisted
of a portion of a bank account and various stock. The court struck
down the award and characterized it as personal property
"principally in the form of stock. ,72 Apparently the bank account
was considered personal property, even though it is clearly
money, the form of property required for alimony payments.
that sale were used to construct a house on the second lot. Mr. Green was found
to hold a portion of the first residence on a resulting trust for Mrs. Green, and
[the court] held the trust could be traced into the second residence.
270 S.C. at 220, 241 S.E.2d at 568.
63. Id. at 221, 241 S.E.2d at 568.
64. 271 S.C. 475, 248 S.E.2d 308 (1978).
65. The wife's pleadings were an answer and counterclaim in which she prayed only
for alimony and attorney's fees. Record at 4.
66. Piana v. Piana, 239 S.C. 367, 123 S.E.2d 297 (1961).
67. Moyle v. Moyle, 262 S.C. 308, 204 S.E.2d 46 (1974).
68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-1020 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
69. 271 S.C. at 476, 248 S.E.2d at 309.
70. Id. at 477, 248 S.E.2d at 309.
71. Id.
72. Id.
[Vol. 31
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In Gasque v. Eagle Machine Co. 3 the court discussed the
meaning of "property" in South Carolina Code section 36-2-31811
regarding the extent of a seller's warranty for goods. The court
cited the generally accepted meaning of "property" as set forth
in Gibbes v. National Hospital Service, Inc.75 "Property is a
general term to designate the right of ownership; and includes
every subject, of whatever nature, upon which such a right can
legally attach. It is not necessary that the subject of it should be
either lands, goods or chattels; for it extends to money and securi-
ties.""6 The concept of property is very comprehensive and in-
cludes any valuable right or interest protected by law, any civil
right of pecuniary nature, valid contract, and choses in action."
Hence, although money is property, the court in Smith ap-
parently considered it fungible and not specific property. As fun-
gible property it does not violate the prohibition against transfers
of specific property for alimony; however, when money takes the
form of a specific bank account, Smith and McCullough operate
to strike down the unconditional order of its transfer in lieu of
alimony.
Numerous objections to the "specific property transfer" of
certain types of property, such as trusts, health or life insurance,
government benefits, workman's compensation payments and
tort judgments, undoubtedly exist. The practitioner should note,
however, that although these arguments might prove effective in
individual cases to prevent a specific transfer, Wilson provides for
a remand for determination of ari alternative sum of money as
alimony when alimony payments are justified. 8
The prohibition of specific property transfers does not limit
the court to consideration of only the wage earning potential of
the husband when determining a proper sum for alimony. In
McMurtrey v. McMurtrey" the husband was found in contempt
for failure to pay monthly alimony of $125 to his wife. The hus-
band claimed that total disability prevented him from earning
73. 270 S.C. 499, 243 S.E.2d 831 (1978). For discussion of Gasque see Products Liabil-
ity, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 31 S.C.L. REv. 101, 101-07 (1979).
74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-318 (1976).
75. 202 S.C. 304, 24 S.E.2d 513 (1943).
76. Id. at 308, 24 S.E.2d at 514 (quoting Pell v. Ball, 17 S.C. Eq. (Speers Eq.) 48, 83
(1843)).
77. See 202 S.C. at 308-09, 24 S.E.2d at 515.
78. 270 S.C. at 222, 241 S.E.2d at 569.
79. 272 S.C. 118, 249 S.E.2d 503 (1978).
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enough money to make the alimony payments." In upholding the
trial court's finding of contempt, the supreme court did not deem
it necessary to determine the disability or employability of the
husband since he owned a "sufficient financial resource from
which to generate the funds"-an unencumbered 123 acre farm
and an eight-room brick house.8' Citing Eagerton v. Eagerton,
82
the court declared that "[tihere is no limitation that alimony
payments be made solely from current earnings. 8 3 Although the
husband was not compelled to convey the farm to his wife, the
court found it permissible essentially to force him to liquidate
portions of his property to generate the necessary funds to satisfy
his duty of alimony.
Shortly after the Smith prohibition of specific transfers of
property in lieu of alimony, one author characterized the decision
as unwittingly imposing severe limitations on the ability of courts
to order adequate awards of alimony.84 During 1978, however, the
supreme court showed remarkable flexibility in avoiding the flat
prohibition on specific property transfers. Jones sanctioned the
use of an alternative choice of a specific property transfer,
5
Wilson suggested theories of equitable contribution and resulting
trust,8 and McMurtrey authorized lower courts to consider obli-
gors' property holdings in determining ability to generate funds
to satisfy alimony obligations.
Joseph M. Arndt, III
80. Id. at 121, 249 S.E.2d at 505.
81. Id.
82. 265 S.C. 90, 217 S.E.2d 146 (1975).
83. 272 S.C. at 121, 249 S.E.2d at 505.
84. Domestic Relations, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 28 S.C.L. REv. 308,
310 (1976).
85. See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
86. See text accompanying notes 54-61 supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 78-82 supra.
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